An abort path that works when everything else has failed
Shutoff and bleed control for rocketry, designed to remain commandable precisely when the primary avionics are the thing that has gone wrong.
The constraint
A safety system that shares components, power or software with the system it protects is not a safety system. The requirement was an abort path that stays available when the primary avionics have failed, including when they have failed in an unhelpful way — still powered, still transmitting, no longer correct.
The propellant path additionally has to be made safe on a schedule that does not depend on anything else continuing to work.
What we did
Independence was the first design rule and it was applied throughout: separate power, separate command path, separate processing, no shared failure mode with the primary system.
The system fails in a known direction. Loss of command, loss of power or loss of confidence all resolve to the safe state rather than to an indeterminate one. Arming logic and interlocks were specified so that reaching a commandable-abort state is deliberate and observable, and so the system cannot be armed by accident or left armed by oversight.
Testing was weighted accordingly: the abort path was exercised far more than the nominal path, including under induced failures of the primary avionics, because the abort path is the only one whose reliability is unconditional.
Result
- Abort authority independent of the primary avionics, verified under induced failure
- Deterministic safe state on loss of command, power or confidence
- Observable arming state, with interlocks against inadvertent arming
- Bleed sequencing on an independent schedule
A safety system is defined by what it does when its own inputs are unreliable. Everything else is a control system.
Where this sits
This work sits under Power and safety-critical control.
Tell us the constraint you cannot get past
The mass budget, the latency, the environment, the certification route. We will tell you honestly whether it is something we should be working on — and if it is not, who should.