Power and safety-critical control
Batteries and termination systems are the two places where a design shortcut cannot be recovered in flight. We treat both as safety-critical, because they are.
A battery that reports voltage is telling you nothing
Voltage under no load is the least informative number a pack can give you. We build power systems that know their own condition and say so in time to act — cell-level monitoring, temperature management across the real operating range, state of health tracked across cycles, and CAN integration so the vehicle and the ground see the same truth.
That matters most in the cold, at altitude, and late in a pack's service life. Those are the three conditions where a nominal-looking battery quietly stops being able to deliver what the airframe is about to ask of it.
A safety system that shares anything is not one
We build systems whose only job is to stop something safely: motor cut-off and flight termination for aircraft, shutoff and bleed control for rocketry.
Safety-critical control is a different discipline from flight software. It is built independent of the system it protects, to fail in a known direction, and to stay commandable when the primary avionics are the thing that has failed — including when they have failed unhelpfully: still powered, still transmitting, no longer correct. We design the authority boundaries, the interlocks and the arming logic on that basis, and we test the abort path far harder than the nominal one.
This part of the work ships as hardware
Our motor cut-off and parachute systems are the visible example: installed without voiding the aircraft warranty, independent of the flight controller, and keeping avionics and video alive through the descent so the aircraft can still be found.
They are built on commercial cells, connectors and initiators we also distribute, which is how we know what each of them does at the edge of its rating rather than in the middle.
What you get
- Power systems that warn before they fail rather than while failing
- An abort path independent of the system it protects
- Hardware an operator can install and service
Related work
Tell us the constraint you cannot get past
The mass budget, the latency, the environment, the certification route. We will tell you honestly whether it is something we should be working on — and if it is not, who should.